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Abstract: In a self-assessment system, the tax office has a passive position. Their 
main duty of the tax office is to ensure that taxes that are calculated and paid by 
the taxpayers are in accordance with the applicable tax rules. The main instrument 
for this purpose is, in an income tax context, the income tax return. Based on the 
information written by taxpayers in this form, the tax office then conducts a set of 
activities to see of the tax return contains information that reflects taxpayer’s reality.
The self-assessment system carries a consequence that taxpayer compliance has 
a major role in determining the amount of taxes that are collected by the tax office. 
If the taxpayers comply with the tax rules, then consequently, more tax revenue will 
be collected. On the contrary, if the compliance rate is low, then there will be less 
revenue.
This research looks at this issue. The focus is individual taxpayers as their 
contribution to the total revenue currently is low. For this purpose, this research 
uses an experimental approach using participants from students at the PKN STAN 
(from both school leavers and civil servants), tax trainers at the Pusdiklat Pajak, 
and newly-recruited employees of the tax office. The experiment reveals that firstly, 
on average the research participants report less income that it should have been 
reported. Secondly, it is revealed that audit rate and penalty rate are the two most 
important factors in influencing the amount of income reported by the research 
participants.
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Introduction
Tax has an important role in Indonesia 
as most of national revenue is derived 
from taxation. In 2016 for instance, 
more than 86% of national revenue is 
based on taxation (BPS citation here). 
Unfortunately, since 2009, tax revenue 
is always lower that what is targeted at 
the national budget (Figure 1). The last 
time the target revenue is met was in 
2008 possibly due to the sunset policy. 
Sunset policy is basically a limited-type 
of tax amnesty whereby some of the 
administrative penalty for unpaid taxes 
is forfeited.
Figure 1 Revenue to target ratio
The main type of taxes administered 
by the central government in Indonesia 
includes income tax, value-added tax, 
sales tax on luxury goods, property tax, 
and stamp duty. The emphasis of this 
research is on the income tax paid by 
individuals. The reason for this is that 
although income tax carries the bulk of tax 
revenue, the contribution of individual 
income taxpayers is low (Table 1).
Indonesia uses the self-assessment 
system whereby taxpayers calculate, 
pay, and then report their tax payable. 
As a consequence, the taxation system 
relies on the honesty of taxpayers to 
comply with the tax rules when they fill 
in various information their tax return. 
This includes, among other things, the 
amount of taxable income. 
The tax office has a mechanism to check 
the accuracy of what is reported by the 
taxpayers in their tax return. If it is found 
that a particular taxpayer fails to report 
the data accurately, then penalty will be 
applied. Otherwise, or if the tax office 
does not take actions against taxpayers’ 
tax return (and this is normally the 
Tax Type
Amount Proportion (%)
2014 2015 2014 2015
Income tax on oil 30,327.49 12,007.62 5.55 2.00
Income tax on natural gas 57,118.05 38,101.25 10.45 6.35
Income tax on natural gas (other) 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00
Income tax (article 21) 105,625.44 114,428.23 19.33 19.06
Income tax (article 22) 7,256.14 8,484.65 1.33 1.41
Income tax (article 22 on importation) 39,453.73 40,252.35 7.22 6.70
Income tax (article 23) 25,535.47 28,121.53 4.67 4.68
Income tax (article 25/29, individuals) 4,704.41 8,992.42 0.86 1.50
Income tax (article 25/29, body corporate) 148,719.21 184,295.30 27.21 30.69
Income tax (article 26) 34,728.02 43,113.29 6.35 7.18
Income tax (borne by the government) 5,655.30 2,328.79 1.03 0.39
Income tax (final) 87,318.12 120,113.94 15.98 20.00
Income tax (other) 88.82 189.39 0.02 0.03
Table 1 Low contribution of income tax (individuals)
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case), then the information contained in 
the tax return is deemed to be true. It is 
therefore can be seen that in the current 
taxation system, it is taxpayers, rather 
than the tax office, who play a major role. 
The more compliant they are, the higher 
the tax revenue would be.
It is unfortunate that while taxpayer’s 
compliance is of importance, their 
compliance level is however relatively 
unknown, particularly in the Indonesian 
context. This research is therefore aimed 
at addressing this issue focusing on 
individual income taxpayers mainly due 
to their low contribution, as identified 
earlier (Table 1). In this context, this 
research focuses only on taxable income. 
This is because in a self-assessment 
system, the calculation of taxable income 
is conducted by the taxpayers. As a result, 
they have the opportunity to under report 
their income, particularly those who 
are not subject extensive withholding 
mechanism.
An under reporting is seen by the 
law as a criminal offence. According to 
Becker, a criminal offence generally is 
affected by the probability of detection, 
the severity of penalty, and other factor. 
Becker believes that criminal offenders 
act rationally. This means that they 
choose an action that carries more 
benefit. As a consequence, a wrongdoing 
will not be taken place if the risk of being 
detected and the penalty rate is high.
In the taxation context, Allingham and 
Sandmo assert that taxpayers can choose 
to:
1. report all of their taxable income and 
pay the tax payable in full.
2. report some of their income and pay 
less tax.
If the second option is taken, and the 
tax office does not take any action, then 
the taxpayers will enjoy higher after tax 
income as opposed to the first alternative. 
However, if this action is detected by the 
tax office, then they will have lower after 
tax income as they have pay penalty in 
addition to the unpaid tax. 
The amount of reported income is 
therefore increases when the applicable 
penalty rate or the probability of detection 
rises. As for income, if a taxpayer is risk-
averse, then the higher their income is 
the higher the amount of their reported 
income will be. By contrast, if a taxpayer 
is a risk taker, the more money they 
have will only result in a lesser reported 
income. Similar effects also apply for tax 
rate because a higher tax rate provides 
an incentive for risk takers to lower their 
reported income. Here, the benefit of 
being non-compliant is the tax saving 
on the unreported income, whereas the 
cost is the risk of being detected and the 
penalty to be levied (Gruber, 2012). 
In line with Becker’s account, then 
taxpayers decide to be non-compliant if 
they see the benefit outweigh the cost. 
As an example, a taxpayer obtains a tax 
benefit of Rp 15 million if he decides not 
to report an income of Rp 100 million 
(tax rate = 30%). If the government 
increases tax rate to 30%, perhaps as 
an effort to tackle a decrease of revenue 
due to rampant non-compliance, then 
his saving rises to Rp 30 million. This 
pushes MB1 to MB2, indicating a lower 
amount of unreported income (from A to 
C). By contrast, if the tax office decides 
to tighten its law enforcement activities, 
it increases the probability of detection, 
resulting in more taxpayers being 
apprehended and ultimately penalised. 
This shifts MC1 to MC2 thereby reduce 
the amount of unreported income from 
A to B (Figure 2).
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Empirical findings seem to be 
consistent with this, as summarised by 
Alm, McClelland, dan Schulze (1992) as 
follows:
1. Empirical findings
a. Audit probability is positively 
correlated with reported income.
b. Tax rate is negatively correlated 
with reported income.
c. Real income is positively correlated 
with reported income.
d. Compliance rate tend to be lower 
for non-married, younger, and 
self-employed taxpayers.
2. Experimental findings
a. Audit probability is positively 
correlated with reported income.
b. An increase in penalty rate only 
slightly increases compliance.
c. Tax rate does not have significant 
effect on reported income.
d. Real income is positively correlated 
with reported income.
e. Older or female taxpayers tend to 
be more compliant.
As for education, Birch, Peters and 
Sawyer (2003) argue that it is positively 
correlated with income although Juanda 
(2010) claims that undergraduate 
students tend to have higher compliance 
rate compared to post graduate students. 
In a different tone, in this context, 
Tan and Chin-Fatt (2003) believe that 
education does not have a significant 
effect on compliance.
In an experimental study, Juanda 
(2010) also reports that the higher a 
taxpayer’s the income is, the lower their 
compliance will be. This is confirmed by 
Prasetyo (2011), based in his analysis on 
income tax returns, who reports that the 
higher the income of a taxpayer is, the 
lower their compliance will be. Prasetyo 
(2011) also reports that self-employed 
taxpayers tend to be less compliant 
compared to employed taxpayers, which 
is consistent with findings reported 
by Wallschutzky (1988). In is also 
interesting in this context to note what 
is reported by Slemrod, Blumenthal 
and Christian (2001) where high-wealth 
taxpayers, contrary to low-income 
taxpayers, will likely be less compliant 
if they receive a notice that they will be 
Figure 2 Tax evasion model Source: adapted from Gruber (2012)
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subject to an audit. Tax rate basically 
also shows similar pattern, where some 
researchers, such as Vogel (1972) and 
Clotfelter (1983), believe that an increase 
in tax rate reduces compliance while 
others, such as Wahlund (1993), argues 
that it does not have a significant effect 
on tax evasion.
Juanda (2010) also reports that an 
audit probability positively correlated 
with compliance level, which normally 
is the case (Marriott et al, 2013). In this 
context, it is important to note the type of 
taxpayers that are subject to audit. Here, 
Gemmell and Ratto (2012) found an 
evidence that if compliant taxpayers are 
subject to audit, then their compliance 
in the future would potentially decrease. 
On the contrary, if non-compliant 
taxpayers are subject to audits, their 
future compliance increases.
Another factor influencing taxpayer 
compliance is the severity of penalty. 
Although theoretically an increase in 
penalty improve compliance, its effect 
may be small (Arandse, 2010). Similarly, 
Marriott et al (2013) also report that 
audit probability and penalty are not 
significant in improving taxpayer 
compliance. In fact, increasing penalty 
may make compliance worsen (Gneezy 
and Rustichini, 2000).
This research, in essence, endeavours 
to see how those factors work in an 
Indonesian context. It seeks to answer 
the following questions:
1. In average, what is the percentage of 
income reported by the taxpayers?
2. What are the effect of tax rate, penalty 
rate, income, and audit probability 
on reported income?
Method
To answer the said questions, this 
research uses an experimental approach. 
This approach is taken because it 
enables the researchers to separately 
analyse the effect of a certain variable 
and to obtain sensitive information at a 
lower cost (Libby, Bloomfield, & Nelson, 
2002). However, it carries a weakness 
that as the experiment participants are 
normally students, the results may fail to 
adequately represent the population. In 
other words, the results may be difficult 
to generalise to the intended population, 
as addressed by Marriott (2013) and 
previously by Giridharadas (2010) for 
a different context. Druckman and 
Kam (2011) however argue that the 
result of an experiment with students 
as the participants are not significantly 
different to those that use ‘real people.’
In the taxation context, the tax 
experiment conducted by Marriott, 
Randal, and Holmes (2013) that uses 
real taxpayers as participants shows 
similar result to those that use students 
as participants as summarised by 
Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992). 
This is probably the reason why most 
experimental research uses students as 
research participants (Marriott, Randal, 
and Holmes, 2012).
In this regard, this research uses 
a combination of students and non-
Table 2 Research participants
No Participants Type Number
1 D3 (accounting) Students 37
2 D3 (taxation) Students 30
3 D4 (accounting) Employee (tax office, old recruit) 36
4 Training participants Employee (tax office, new recruit) 36
5 Tax trainers Employee 18
Total 157
Hasanuddin Economics and Business Review
Vol. 1 No. 1 (27-38)
32
students as research participants.
Each participant is given money at the 
sum of Rp 100 thousand at the beginning 
of the game and are requested to play 
nine different games (Table 3). The 
amount of money to be kept at the end 
of the game depends on their response 
for each game.
Table 3 Game details
No Item Value
1 Taxable income (per annum) Rp 200.000.000,00 Control game
Penalty rate 50%
Tax rate 25%
Participants to be audited 5 participants
2 Taxable income (per annum) Rp 100.000.000,00 Income decreases
              Penalty rate                                                                                    50%
  Tax rate 25%
Participants to be audited 5 participants
3 Taxable income (per annum) Rp 300.000.000,00 Income increases
Penalty rate 50%
Tax rate 25%
Participants to be audited 5 participants
4 Taxable income (per annum) Rp 200.000.000,00 Tax rate decreases
Penalty rate  50%
Tax rate  5%
Participants to be audited  5 participants
5 Taxable income (per annum) Rp 200.000.000,00 Tax rate increases
Penalty rate  50%
Tax rate  50%
Participants to be audited  5 participants
6 Taxable income (per annum) Rp 200.000.000,00 Penalty rate decreases
Penalty rate  25%
Tax rate  25%
Participants to be audited  5 participants
7 Taxable income (per annum) Rp 200.000.000,00 Penalty rate increases
Penalty rate  100%
Tax rate  25%
Participants to be audited  5 participants
8 Taxable income (per annum) Rp 200.000.000,00 Audit probability decreases
Penalty rate  50%
Tax rate  25%
Participants to be audited  1 participant
9 Taxable income (per annum) Rp 200.000.000,00 Audit probability increases
Penalty rate  50%
Tax rate  25%
Participants to be audited  7 participants
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Several aspects need to be noted 
in Table 3. Firstly, the tax rate in this 
experiment does not use the progressive 
income tax rate stipulated in the income 
tax legislation for simplicity reason. This 
is because not every participant is familiar 
with the rules that stipulate how tax is 
calculated. Secondly, the participants 
to be audited are selected at random. 
In reality, the tax office uses certain 
criteria similar purpose. This research, 
however, is interested in the change 
in behaviour if the audit probability 
changes and this is best captured using 
random selection. Lastly, the number of 
participants to be audited seems to be 
large. In reality, the number of taxpayers 
who are subject to such audit is much 
smaller (less than 1%). The focus of this 
research is on the behavioural change if 
the audit probability is changed. As such, 
the emphasis is on the direction of the 
change, as opposed to the number of the 
taxpayers who are subject to audits.
In order to achieve this, the research 
participants are requested to play the 
game scenario in Table 3 starting from 
game number 1 and see the researchers 
as the tax officials. The participants are 
given a card showing their amount of 
taxable income for a particular year (Rp 
200 million for game number 1). One 
colour-coded card is given for each game. 
They were then requested to write the 
number of income that they are going to 
report, the amount income tax that they 
have to pay, and the remaining income 
available for them (taxable income less 
income tax). The participants are also 
requested that:
1. They are free to decide the amount 
that they are willing to report. This 
means they can report their whole 
income or no income at all. This 
carries a consequence that it is 
possible for a participant to leave the 
research room with the full amount 
of money allocated to him/her. As 
an example, if a taxpayer reports no 
income, then he/she could leave the 
research room with a full income 
of Rp 200 million. However, if that 
participant decides a full disclosure, 
then he/she will have a net income 
of Rp 150 million. The ratio of the 
income reported and the actual 
taxable income is then calculated 
using the following formula:
2. The researchers will select research 
participants who are subject to 
audit at random. If a particular 
participant is selected to audit, that 
participant’s card will be separated 
and be seen if the reported income 
is less than the taxable income. If 
so, that participant will be subject 
to penalty and must pay the unpaid 
tax. As an example, a participant 
who reports an income of Rp 40 
million will be required to pay the 
unpaid income tax of Rp 40 million 
(being the difference between Rp 
150 million that he/she should have 
been paid and Rp 10 million that 
he/she actually pays) and a penalty 
of Rp 20 million (being 50% of the 
unpaid tax of Rp 40 million). In the 
end, that participant will have a net 
income of Rp 130 million (being Rp 
200 million less Rp 10 million of tax 
that he/she pays, less Rp 40 million 
of unpaid tax, and less Rp 20 million 
of penalty), which is lower compared 
to the amount of money that he/she 
reports his/her full income.
3. After finish playing game number 9, 
participants are given sum of money 
as a result of participating in the 
research. The total of money that 
is given to a participant is based on 
the average of that participant’s net 
income from all nine games that he/
Hasanuddin Economics and Business Review
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she played. As a result, the more net 
income that he/she obtains, the more 
money that he/she receives at the end 
of the game.
4. A specialised database application 
based on Microsoft Access was 
created to manage the data obtained 
from the experiment. This includes 
data recording, the calculation of 
tax payable, the ration of reported 
income to taxable income, penalty 
applicable, net income, and money to 
be paid at the end of the game. SPSS 
version 23 is also used to perform 
some statistical analysis.
Analysis and Discussion
Reported Income
Based on game number 1, it is revealed 
that the research participants only report 
on average Rp 166 million from Rp 200 
million that should have been reported. 
This means they only report 83% of their 
actual taxable income (Table 4).
Table 4 reveals that participants from 
D4 accounting students on average report 
lower income compared to participants 
from other groups although the difference is 
not significant (α=0.05). These participants 
are employees of Ministry of Finance and 
mostly have good understanding of tax 
laws. Those who are from the tax office 
are in fact familiar with tax minimising 
schemes. They also know that in practice, 
it is unlikely that a taxpayer will be subject 
to an audit. As such, it is possible that they 
are more confident in under reporting 
their income. This may cause their ratio in 
reported income lower than the rest of the 
participants.
A different situation is faced by tax 
trainers. Although they also have a good 
understanding on the operation of tax 
laws, their average reported income is 
higher. This is possibly because of the 
fact that most of their students are from 
the tax office. As such, there seems to be 
a reluctance in evading taxes due to their 
nature as trainers that are required to set 
examples to their students.
On the other hand, research 
participants who are from training 
participants show the highest level of 
reported income. As indicated earlier, 
they are newly-recruited employees of 
the tax office mostly from fresh graduates 
with minimal exposure to taxation laws. 
As such, they show a behaviour that is 
similar to the D3 (accounting) students.
These results are largely similar to 
what is reported by Juanda (2010) 
where participants from higher 
education level show lower compliance. 
However, Juanda (2010) does not have 
an account on the compliance level of 
newly-recruited tax officers. As Table 
4 has shown, participants from newly-
recruited tax officers have higher 
compliance compared to participants 
from more experienced employees (D4 
students).
No Participants Mean
Confidence Interval Standard 
deviationLower Upper
1 D4 (accounting) .70208 .58140 .82277 .356690
2 D3 (accounting) .86676 .80635 .92717 .181181
3 Tax trainers .85694 .73817 .97572 .238840
4 Training participants .94819 .90864 .98774 .116889
5 D3 (taxation) .79667 .67419 .91914 .327986
Overall .83315 .79056 .87575 .270199
Table 4 Ratio of reported income
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their income highest when the number of 
audit is increased. By contrast, they the 
average of reported to actual income ratio 
falls to its lowest point when the number 
of audit is decreased. This indicates 
that it is important for the tax office to 
ensure that the audits are maintained an 
adequate level.
Another factor that is important in 
improving compliance is penalty rate. 
Factors Influencing Compliance
Several factors identified in the 
literature that are important in 
influencing taxpayer compliance are 
analysed in this research with results 
shown in Table 5.
Table 5 and particularly Figure 3 show 
that the research participants report 
The participants report more income 
when the penalty rate is increased and 
accordingly, they lower their reported 
income when penalty rate is reduced, 
a result that is generally consistent 
with what is predicted by Allingham 
and Sandmo (1976). This provides an 
indication that penalty rate can be used as 
an effective tool to tackle non-compliant 
activities. As such, it is important for the 
tax office to maintain their law enforcing 
activities such as gijzeling and audit 
adequately ((Septian, 2015 and Jati, 
2015). This is because before a taxpayer 
is subject to penalty, that taxpayer has 
to be audited first. As audit is normally a 
result of a third party information, then 
information exchange undoubtedly plays 
a crucial role. However, it is important to 
note in this regard that increasing audit 
rate may in fact reduce compliance if 
the audit is aimed at already-compliant 
taxpayers (Gemmel and Ratto, 2012).
Another factor that is of interest is 
that an increase in income increases the 
amount of taxable income reported by 
the research participants. This provides 
an indication that the participants are 
generally risk taker as the more income 
they have, the more money they hide. 
This generally is consistent with what is 
reported by Juanda (2010) and Prasetyo 
Table 5 Game results
No Factors Mean Std. Deviation
Confidence Interval
Lower Upper
1 Standard game .83315 .270199 .79056 .87575
2 Income decreases .87449 .287786 .82897 .92000
3 Income decreases .81972 .274915 .77624 .86320
4 Tax rate decreases .90635 .229918 .86987 .94284
5 Tax rate increases .73484 .334415 .68195 .78773
6 Penalty rate decreases .75452 .314261 .70312 .80593
7 Penalty rate increases .92143 .211016 .88817 .95470
8 Audit decreases .72958 .402893 .66565 .79351
9 Audit increases .99203 .255087 .95282 1.03124
Figure 3 Game comparisons
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(2011). For the tax office, this carries a 
consequence that their emphasis should 
be on high-income earners as they not only 
are willing to be con compliant, they can 
also afford to do so, possibly by obtaining 
tax advice from their consultants as seen 
in the Panama Papers.
Lastly, an increase in tax rate is 
followed by the action of the participants 
to reduce their reported income. Again 
this gives an indication of risk-taker 
participants. This is because as tax rate is 
increased, then the amount of benefit of 
reducing reported income (in the form of 
tax saving) is higher. The participants are 
apparently willing to take the additional 
risk to obtain more tax saving. Table 6 
summarises these results.
Conclusion
The experiment illustrated in this 
paper shows the following:
1. On average, the research participants 
report 83% of their actual taxable 
income to the tax office. This 
provides an indication that taxpayers 
in general do not fully report their 
taxable income to the tax office.
2. From several factors identified in 
the literature as having important 
effect on reported income, audit 
is indicated by the participant as 
having the highest effect on reported 
income followed by penalty rate and 
tax rate. This experiment also shows 
an evidence of risk-taker taxpayers 
indicated by the reduction of reported 
income as the participants’ income 
or tax rate increases. High income 
earners are also shown to be prone to 
non-compliance activities.
From this experiment, it can be seen 
that it is important for the tax office to 
maintain the audit rate at an adequate 
level. The audits would potentially 
more effective if they are aimed at high-
income earners as they are more likely to 
be involved in tax evasion or avoidance 
game.
None the less, it is to be noted that 
the experiment described in this paper 
is subject to some limitations. Firstly, 
most participants are students that act 
as taxpayers’ proxy. Although it has been 
argued that the results generally are 
not significantly different, it will still be 
possible to improve the accuracy of the 
experiment if the participants constitute 
real taxpayers. Secondly, the participants 
of this experiment generally have limited 
exposure to business activities as they 
are either students or employees. 
Business owners generally are viewed 
having wider opportunities in evasion or 
avoidance activities. This unfortunately 
cannot be captured adequately in this 
paper. Future research endeavour would 
without a doubt be more fruitful if these 
limitations can be addressed.
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